Center for Archival Collections

January 25, 1890

Reply to yours of 1/22
St. Louis, Mo. Jan 25, 1890

Col Arnold McMahan
Toledo, Ohio

Dear Sir & Comrade;

Of all the very many letters I have received, from the highest general to the lowest private, regarding the battle of Chickamauga, not one compares in value to me, with yours; so you can judge from this how happy I am to hear from you.

Gen. Boynton was with me when I was making the surveys on the field, and showed me where his regiment lay.

While I do not remember exactly the two trees that you speak of, I know the lay of the land thoroughly, all along that part of the ridge. 132 ft. to the east of where the 35th Ohio was placed across the ridge, after your capture, are a lot of old citizens graves, that were there before the war. They made a splendid land mark.

I would send you a profile and bird's eye view of the whole of the Snodgrass ridge, if I had any of them left. I will soon make some more copies and will then send you one.

I had my theodolite transit along, and took elevations, courses and distances, & of the entire ridge, from near the Vidito House, and east of the Snodgrass House.

I have found no one before who knew definitely, or even approximately, where Kelly's troops came up the ridge.

Your regiment must have joined very closely on to the 35th Ohio at the time of the capture. And as near as I can judge the 22nd Mich. joined on to you on the right next to them was the 89th Ohio; but from most of the reports the two regiments must have been somewhat intermingled. To the right of the 89th Ohio there must have been a gap - but how that gap occurred, I have not been able to fix definitely yet. As near as I can judge; however, it was caused by the withdrawal of the 115th Ills. after Gen. Steedman had taken them back on the ridge when he found them withdrawing the time of the noted flag episode of which you have doubtless heard frequently.

From the lay of the land there, and the reports made by different officers of the three regiments captured, I am inclined to think that the rebels must have come up to the west of the 89th Ohio, and got well around to their rear, before they closed in on you.

But as you, from your letter, evidently have a very clear remembrance as to the incidents there, I shall be grateful to you, if you will fully explain them.

The right of the 35th Ohio was just at the base of a declivity on the summit of the ridge, and your regiment must have been in that declivity, the other two, along the ascending crest of the ridge, at the time of the capture.

The report of the whole of the battle, for the two days, is very conflicting. I drove over considerable of the field with Genls. Fullerton and Boynton and Col. Robinson of the 121st Ohio. Genl. Boynton had been there frequently, and from the statements made by them, I can see that the whole of the field is in very nearly the same muddle that it is to the right of the Snodgrass Ridge during the afternoon of the 20th. How great that muddle is, I do not think you are at all aware.

As you say, those trees are the best of witnesses; and as I have frequently said, the lay of the land, and the trees all over the field, are witnesses that cannot be disputed, and that no impossibilities enacted that day. When it is attempted to locate troops and hard fighting on ground where the trees do not show any marks of any fighting, I know that there is an error.

They had my Battery, (M. 1st Ills.) located nearly 1/4 of a mile from where it actually fought. They have Gen. Whitaker's right, more than 1/4 of a mile from where it should have been, if it ever reached the point they have marked, it must, as I have said, have flown over the heads of the rebels.

I found, on parts of the field, other marks in the trees, where no one seems to have known that anyone fought, and I have not yet been able to trace anyone having been there.

Just at night, I saw a body of infantry lying along the crest of a ridge. I have not yet been able to learn what infantry they were, nor when they got there.

After my Battery had entered the timber some little distance, perhaps a little west of the rear of where you were, the infantry marching along carelessly each side of the guns we were fired upon by a body of perhaps two hundred rebels to the left of us, about 15 rods distant, and apparently near the crest of the ridge. Our infantry immediately formed and began a charge on them. Gen. Steedman came dashing from toward the front, yelling: "Halt, halt, for God's sake, halt!" and rode to the flag bearer, seizing the flag, wheeled his force facing the troops, waved the flag and halted them, and then led them along up the slope of the ridge, until we reached the crest going to the west; we proceeded along the crest until we reached the point where my guns took position at the extreme west end of the ridge, where it forma a right angle and extends south, toward the Vidito House. From the time we were fired upon, until my guns took position I saw no rebels. We marched along the crest of the ridge unmolested. Now I have never been able to learn what troops they were who fired upon us, nor, which regiments or parts of regiments of our infantry, engaged in the projected charge, and have only found a few persons who remember the incident at all.

I shall be grateful to you for the information regarding the sections of Battery G. 1st Ohio, and all other information you can give me.

I am getting the different maneuvers so definitely fixed, where each bears upon the other, that any report that materially conflicts, is readily detected, all movements must dovetail together consistently in the final summing up. I am so well acquainted with that ridge, and all parts on it, that any description you can make, I can readily understand.

I had expected to have lithograph bird's-eye view, and profile map of the whole ridge, completed before this - but as soon as I began it, I decided to wait until I could revisit the field and make surveys of adjoining ridges, so as to show those who have made these conflicting reports, that their statements are utterly inconsistent and impossible.

You have probably noticed that B.R. Johnson says that at night he drove those to our extreme right, fully half a mile. Now I was on the extreme right. There was not an infantryman to the right of my guns, except perhaps for as few minutes, when they came up the ravine after having made a charge. There was no fighting on my right. When we fell back at dusk to the high ridge in the rear, I saw but one rebel following us, and he was about 100 ft. to the rear of our hindmost caisson, and was walking along leisurely, as we were going.

Two of my guns, nos. 2 and 6 had a few minutes before that, been sent to the support of the 96th Ills. but I have not yet been able to locate where they were in reference to the position we held during the afternoon.

The 96th was on the right of the 115th at the first engagement, and I think I know exactly where it was formed along the ridge, as I am quite confident that it charged on the two guns that Anderson speaks of having placed in a ravine for the purpose of drawing them by hand to the top of the ridge in case he succeeded in capturing and holding it. But what became of the Regiment after that I have not been able to determine. I have traced it to a point, and at a certain time when it was seen to be moving. Whether it moved to the rear and disappeared from the front at that time, I have not been able to learn yet.

The two trees you speak of I think I marked with a surveyor's marking tool, when I was there in Nov. but I marked a good many trees and would not attempt to say definitely.

How did it happen that you were so quietly captured? That is something that I cannot account for yet, for I have not yet been able to discover that it was possible for there to have been much of a gap between the 21st and 35th Ohio, and yet Gen. Boynton says that he knew nothing of your capture. He showed me where he was standing, when he first became aware that the troops had disappeared to his right. He said that one of his men had been down the south slope of the ridge, and came back through a bunch of brush and reported that he had seen some rebels coming up the ravine.

Boynton stepped into the brush and peered out through it and saw them. He immediately formed the 35th Ohio across the ridge facing to the west, and then reported to Gen. Brannan the condition of affairs. The Gen. told him to return there and he would send some remnants of regiments that had just reported to him to strengthen his position. Boynton remarked to him that they might question his rank. Brannan told him to say nothing about rank that he would tell them to report to the officer there in command. Boynton returned to the line, and as the troops came up he placed them at right angles to the ridge, and crossing it down the north slope. He had but shortly done this when a rebel officer rode up, and wanted to know what troops those were. A man answered, 35th Ohio, the officer wheeled to ride away, when they fired on him, and killed him and his horse. And that was the last they saw of the rebels that night.

Now to the right of the 89th they were equally ignorant of your capture. The 115th and 96th Ills. must both have been withdrawn from the field before that, or the rebels certainly could not have come up over the ridge to your rear, without their observing them.

Where my two guns were sent to the support of the 96th Ills. the rebels came diagonally up the ridge from the northeast, and were close on the guns, the infantry withdrew and left the guns. The Lt. in command of the guns ordered them limbered up. They both had charges of canister in. One piece obeyed the command, but the gunner of the other said that he was going to give them the charge in his gun before withdrawing, even though he lost his gun, and fired into them, an enfilading shot, which checked them, and they did not come any further; so that the two guns were taken off without anyone following them, or attempting to capture them.

Please pardon me for boring you with this lengthy letter. I am very anxious, however, to see the monuments correctly placed on the field after it shall be made a National Park. And I want to determine if possible, where the commands all fought, and have such positive proofs of the positions, that no one will question their correctness after examining the proofs.

And all information that you can give me, that will help to accomplish this, I assure you I will be grateful for, as I suppose every other man who fought on that ridge, will be.

Yours in F. C. & L.
G. E. Dolton

February 3, 1890

G. E. Dolton
18 S. Main Street
St. Louis Feb. 3/'90

Col. A. McMahan;
Toledo, Ohio.

Dear Sir & Comrade;

I am very happy to hear from you again, but deeply regret your great physical misfortune, and I hope that if there is any possible relief, that you may soon find it, and that life may be as happy and pleasant to you as can be to man. In this Chickamauaga matter, I have no bias whatever. My sole object is to arrive at the exact truth, particularly to find all points on the field where each command was at any time, and the time when it was there in connection with other commands. It is the only way by which it is possible to arrive at the way in which the battle was fought; the only way by which the student can judge of the ability or lack of ability in the different commanders, and the heroism of the different commands. If it were the case, that the 96th Illinois, for instance, drove the rebels half a mile from the ridge and in turn were themselves driven half a mile to the rear of the ridge, as stated in their history, what must the troops on both flanks, union and confederate, have been doing during that time. Were they standing there, admiring spectators of the foot race to and fro? Now, there are just such statements made, and by the highest officials too, not only regarding the right at Chickamauga, but covering the whole field, as I found when I came to trace up each command and compare the reports with the various statements that have been made through the various magazines etc. The last time I saw Gen. Rosecrans, I told him what my purpose was. I knew of course, he must feel very sensitive on the subject, and therefore did not undertake to question him, but he said in a very pleasant manner, in fact, almost "childlike and bland" "You know that I know very little about it". I answered, "Of course, I am aware of it, and that you had to make your official report by the reports made to you by your subordinates["]. But as to the statement of Gen. Boynton, he told me, in the presence of Gen. Fullerton, Col. A. B. Robinson, late of the 121st Ohio, and a Mr. Gill, who also belonged to that regiment, and walked over the ground showing me the different positions where he and the men stood, when the incidents occurred, even stepping out into the brush, where he had been, to peer through. I note what you say about errors that have been published, and how they occur, and it has greatly surprised me when I have noticed them in the past. I have found that every one of them, learning a few facts, rushed into print without investigating whether all they said were also facts; this, frequently, in fact I may say invariably, putting in about as much untruth as truth, into their articles. When I first called on Gen. Fullerton, after I had discovered the mistake on the battlefield in September, he seemed to be about as Col. Kellogg was, unwilling to think that I could know anything about it, if my recollection differed from the statements made by the commanding officers. I saw at once, that it would be useless to argue with him, therefore I began in this way - "You were with Gen. Granger that day, were you not Gen. Fullerton? If so, do you remember, shortly after the ball opened, at 9 o'clock in the morning, Gen. Granger, riding along, came to a battery lying at the north-west corner of an open field, on some high ground near an old log house, out of which a family was then moving, loading their goods into an ox-wagon. You remember that Granger ordered the Battery to follow him, you remember, that after going a couple of miles possibly, we passed a large hospital fly, where they were amputating limbs, and dressing wounds; that the infantry passed to the west side of that, while the Battery passed to the east of it, and shortly after passing it, came out of the woods maybe 20 or 30 rods, a rebel Battery to the east began firing on the infantry. That the Battery with the General, immediately went into position on a slight knoll in the field, and engaged the rebel Battery; that Gen. Granger dismounted, and sighted one of the guns, two or three times and while doing so, nearly lost his head by a shell from the rebels; that he immediately mounted his horse and said 'Limber up and follow me as I have work for you elsewhere'; that he then led us along the west side of the timber, going to the south, following an old farm wagon track, until we reached the end of the field, where the Battery was headed to the west and halted in column of sections; that before we reached the timber where the hospital tent was located, we saw a body of Cavalry moving in the same direction, about a half a mile to the east, that someone said to Gen. Granger, calling his attention to them, that those were Stearn'es Cavalry. Granger looked at them through his glass, and said that they were Union Cavalry, but Capt. Russell pronounced them rebels. The one who had spoken to Gen. Granger, assured him that he knew the Cavalry, on account of an engagement he was in with them at Triune." I took General Fullerton along by degrees describing the land over which we marched, putting the questions to him, however, not in a manner to prompt him, but to draw out his recollection, to make him state the incidents himself, by asking him if he remembered what occurred next after each thing, the lay of the land etc. When I had done that and got him to the Snodgrass house, he was pretty thoroughly interested, and began to think perhaps I did know something about the battle. Before I got through with him that day he was so firmly convinced that there was a mistake there, that he immediately wrote to Col. Kellogg, requesting him to stop work on the official map, until he could go to the battlefield with me and let me point out where my Battery stood and where several regiments that I knew of were. That was the way it happened that I was there with him, Gen. Boynton, Col. Robinson, et al. While we were on that trip, I noticed that everyone there, seemed to be even anxious to fall into, or accept errors, if possible, and I had to continually call their attention to proofs, to show that they were wrong, to prevent it. Gen. Boynton subsequently published an account of the trip, in which he said that two companies of the 96th Ill. supported my Battery on the right. I wrote him to learn where he obtained his information, and he said, from the history of that regiment. It is claimed that those two companies had their regimental flag with them, but kept it covered, is the reason no one recognized them. That they were worked off to the right when Mitchell's troops came up on the ridge; it may be they were there, but I have yet to find anybody of the 121st Ohio, who was aware that there were any strange men among them that afternoon, and I have yet to find any member of the 96th that knows anything of them having been there. I do not like to bore you, Colonel, either with my scribbling, or asking questions, but as soon as I get the matter settled from the right of where your regiment first lay on the ridge, and get my series of maps made, I then want to begin at that point and work to the left, making serial maps showing each maneuver of each regiment, the same as I intended to do on the right, and therefore I should like to know at what time your regiment reached the ridge and its different movements there. I will mail you a rough map which I have made, and will be grateful to you if you will locate on it, the different positions. After I have got the information all in, as far as will be necessary, to establish beyond question all movements of each command, I intend to publish that evidence, in a concise form. This is no money making scheme on my part, except out of pocket, for I do not expect to get 1 cent for it from anyone, but intend to publish only sufficient to go to those who assist me in the work, and those most assuredly I shall not think of charging. I want to get as much of the work done, as possible, before they begin to establish the monuments on the field, so that the monuments may be correctly located, if the department map is erroneous. Gen. Whitaker was, of course, to a great extent, like Gen. Rosecrans, or like any other General on the field, dependent on his subordinates for information. Gen. Rosecrans is accused of having been under the influence of opium, and when I last saw General Whitaker that day, he was under the influence of something that made him reel considerably in his saddle. I do not think, when he left my guns, when he rode to the rear, that he could have told where his command lay. He wanted some of my men to fix bayonets on their cannon, when they told him they were out of ammunition. I assure you I am reaching out for facts. I want nothing but facts, and I intend to have things in such shape, that facts will prove themselves, before I am done with it, if I live. Now, at dusk, when it was so dark as to make it hard to distinguish the color of the uniforms, two guns of my Battery were on the ridge about where the 115th Ill. is located on the map I send you. That was the time when Gen. Steedman took the flag of the 115th Ill., and led their men up to the top of the hill, when he threatened Col. Moore that if he did not take his men up there he would turn the guns on him. The 96th Ill. was yet there, the rebels charged up the ridge, the 96th withdrew and left my guns unsupported. I have thought that those must have been the troops that got around to our rear, after my guns fired their last shot, as the rebels did not follow them as they withdrew. You say that you were on the extreme right, that is, that you saw no one on the right of you, and that you were at the right of the 89th Ohio. Now, Col. Carlton tells me that the 89th was at the right at that time; that he had formed his men diagonally across the ridge, extending from southeast to northwest, and yet that the rebels came up in his rear, having got around his right flank. I have read the confederate reports several times over. Have to do it, in locating them at different times, on the field. But their reports were like those of many of our own officers, - very indefinite, in many cases giving as a single incident what occurred at 2 or 3 different times, at different hours of the day. Some of them so occurred, to my personal knowledge. Col. Carlton, has recently written a very lengthy article in answer to Gen. Turchin's book. This article he sent to Gen. Turchin and promises me a copy of it as soon as it is returned to him. Gen. Turchin, in answer to a letter from me, acknowledged that he knows nothing of what occurred on the right, which of course he does not from his own personal knowledge, nor did he take pains to ever thoroughly investigate before he published his book. Col. Carlton was somewhat acquainted with Gen. Kelly, as they attended West Point at the same time, though not in the same class, and -------- with him that night, practically surrendered to him. About what time of day was it, or how long before the surrender, that you repulsed the rebels as they narrate. From your view, Col. Boynton would have looked down the north slope of the ridge to see the rebels, as they came up in the rear of the three regiments that were captured, but Col. Boynton says, and pointed out to me where they came up, on the south side of the ridge, in the ravine, you will see on my map in front of his right at G. When Col. Boynton faced his troops to the west, they were placed at right angles across the ridge. You say that the three regiments "were sacrificed by the officers accountable for them, through shameful shiftlessness". I do not understand you. To what officers do you refer as being unaccountable for them?

I know the charge has been often made, and I have not undertaken to trace up its justness yet, but intend to do so, and that is why I ask the question now, - who were to blame and in what manner were they to blame. I know many of the men belonging to the 3 regiments, claimed that those regiments were intentionally sacrificed; some claim that they were left on the ridge to hold it long after all the troops at the right and left had withdrawn. But I know you are tired before this. Please pardon me for writing you so lengthily.

Very Respect. Yours in F. C. & L.
G. E. Dolton

February 8, 1890

Col. 21 Ohio Reply to yours of the 6th
St. Louis, Mo. Feb 8, 1890.

Col. Arnold McMahon,
Toledo, Ohio.

Dear Friend & Comrade,

Your note is just at hand. I, too, have received the long-looked-for War Dept. Maps of Chickamauga, and to say that I was disappointed in them, in no manner expresses it. I was vexed, chagrined- yes-everything unpleasant.

I supposed, that after Capt. Kellogg's attention had been so forcibly called to the fact that errors existed on the field, as staked out by the Govt. Commission, that he stopped work on the Map until after I had been there and located my Battery and made the surveys; he would, before proceeding, make such investigations as to have the Maps somewhere near correct. When I was first shown a map of the field, I stated that the Map was wrong - that no such hills existed in the form on the Map, and that was months before I visited the field.

Any one going there can see that my map of the ridge is correct. It is one unbroken ridge from A - to - D - running N & S - then from D - to I and around to M. extending easterly. I followed the crest of the ridge on around the south edge at the top, for the whole distance. I not only went directly to the spot where my four guns stood - following the lines as I had described them in past years; but also showed the bullet that was put in the black oak tree at D - just above my head, by a sharpshooter, during one of the lulls. I was leaning against the tree at the time the bullet struck it. When I was there last November, I cut the outer back off over the bullet, and brought the bark home, but left the bullet in the tree.

J.S. Gill, Delaware, Ohio, an ex-member of the Ohio Legislature, formerly belonging to the 121st Ohio, which supported my bat. was along. He had been on the field twice since the war, and had the spot marked where he was wounded, which he knew by a certain stone at the place marked x to the west of D. He showed where my guns stood before I said a word to him about it, as he came on the field in the rain, when no one was around to post him. He says that at one charge, his regiment followed the rebels out to A, so he could see the fence of the Vidito field at the point in the road at X 875 ft. from A. They were ordered back instantly, as the rebels were all along the east side of the ridge.

The marks on the trees, my recollection and his points, fixed the position of my battery beyond any question. There was no fighting on the ridge to the north where the War Dept. Maps show my guns. The hill is too steep to have made my guns of service where the rebels would have appeared. I was on that ridge only at dark as we were retreating, and at the point marked as "Bat. M. halted", and we withdrew from the ridge, going down it in a N.W. direction, locking the wheels to get down. We struck a little-used road at its base and followed that until it came out into the McFarland Gap road.

Having the battery located, which made the west end of our lines, or pivot, my work which I had set out to do, was completed; but I had by that time become much interested, and proceeded to locate other commands. Gen. Boynton pointed out to me where the 35 Ohio lay, as fixed by the old graves. Then, I knew from a study of the Official reports - Union and Confederate, where Anderson had the two guns in the ravine - and the 96th Ill. charged down the ravine toward them - so that located the 96th. And so I have proceeded, using such evidence only as was consistent with possible facts, until I am confident that I am not many feet out of the way, as to the location of the troops on my map No. 1 - and I have facts innumerable to locate many more regiments, and many subsequent positions of those shown - all proving the correctness of those locations.

You were the first to say anything about the 21st Ohio being on the extreme right at the moment of surrender; but a few days since, I rec'd. a letter written by Rev. E.S. Scott, of Logansport, Ind; formerly of 89 Ohio, who tells how it occurred. I have written Col. Carlton on the subject, as he overlooked the fact, in his letters to me.

You will observe where Granger is stated to have been at 12M. and at 2 P.M. You, undoubtedly, have some knowledge of the facts. My records, written at the time, are quite lengthy and name the hours of each incident. It was my practice to consult my watch and make note of the very minute anything occurred. I made a copy of my minutes and then followed with a detailed account, and mailed the copy and detail home, at first opportunity - some-times sending off two installments in a single day. I retained the original until each book was full. And then sent that home. All of the three accounts I still have. Not only that; but I made a sketch of the country as we advanced, showing courses, distances, all by-roads, small or large creeks, noting kind of land, timber, & c;--the official reports of the Battery were often made from my records--in case of ever having to go over the country again, I would know what was ahead. All of those, I have. I did not lose a single day in my records from the muster-in at Chicago, until we were mustered out.

I mention all this, to show you that I do not need to depend on memory of the war, to any extent. As to Chickamauga - the ground is there, and it and the trees, speak for themselves. As I said to Capt. Kellogg last Sept. when he intimated that I must be crazy to presume to question the reports of Granger, Steedman, et al --- "If every man connected with the army of the Cumberland were to swear to what was not so, it would not make it the truth." I wrote Capt. Kellogg what I think of his maps.

Yours in F.C. & L.
G. E. Dolton

March 26, 1890

Reply to yours of the 24th
St. Louis, Mo. Mar. 26, 1890.

Col. Arnold McMahon,
Toledo, Ohio.

My Dear Sir;

I am happy to hear from you again; but deeply regret your ill health.

As I go deeper into this Chickamauga work, I am making quite a few discoveries that are not perfectly plain on the surface, and this makes me feel all the more determined to go on with my work, and do all in my feeble way, to see justice done to all.

There are many things connected with those Maps that may yet come to the public. I was informed as short time since, that up till then, I was the only one who had found the slightest fault in them; but that every one else from Gen. Rosecrans down, had spoken in the highest praise of them. I know that I ought to have hung my head in shame, and closed my mouth at that; but, I answered - "Suppose you were an officer in our army and are sent over to study foreign battlefields, and you should be given such maps and records as those from which to study the battles - what would you say?"

I hold in my hand, a printed circular bearing date Mar. 12.'90 - and the name "Redfield Proctor, Sec'y of War" as the author, in which these words occur concerning those maps - "They were practically only proof sheets, and have been principally distributed among the survivors who participated in the battle, with a view to criticism and correction." Why was nothing said when they were first issued? - It would have been a good excuse for the "lumping" work of the whole.

I am informed by an insider, that there exists a certain, what he calls - "close corporation", and that the maps were arranged to suit that corporation, and intimates that that corporation intends to so manage as to have the placing of the monuments - and those to be so placed as to give greatest credit to certain ones. This party tells me of the practice of browbeating any who may attempt to show that they are not correct, and to head off what we had hoped to accomplish by getting as many as possible present at the May 21st meeting, some one at Washington, has announced through the press that nothing done at this meeting will be recognized; but that after the Park is established, officers will go there to meet with those who may want to attend, to locate their commands, that is that "close corporation". It will tell anyone who presumes to know to the contrary, that they have studied it over and know and that the others have simply forgotten, so their attendance will be useless. If I live to attend the May 21st Meeting, I intend to have our work done in such shape that they will wish they had not, should the "close corporation" refuse to consider our work. Not a point will be accepted as right, until corroborated by corresponding movements fully established, - and then, I propose that each thing established shall be fastened by affidavit.

I am getting so much testimony which gibes together, from parties who have not seen each other so as to post themselves in that way, that I feel quite secure on many points, and I want to get those men on the field, and then secure their affidavits, after the points are fixed on the map. If I succeed as now promised, there is going to be quite a few changes in Chickamauga reputations. When a man who should have occupied a prominent position that day, confesses to me, in the presence of witnesses (that he thinks will never be heard from) that he cannot remember what occurred or what he did, except two or three things of that whole day, and then goes before the world in books and magazines as knowing of his personal knowledge, I propose letting the facts be known someday.

And this recalls what Genl. Rosecrans said to me about his own recollections; but of that anon. Did you ever hear of Genl. Rosecrans leaving the field on the P.M. of the 19th and going to Chattanooga? Please say nothing of this; but I have an assurance and am hunting for the truth. I have not mentioned it to any one else.

How does it look on those maps, to see two brigades of Confederates chasing eight brigades of Union troops off the field - and then to think that we of the Reserve Corps, not only hold those two brigades at bay during the whole of the afternoon, but also, McNair, Manigault, Fulton, Gregg, Trigg, Kelly, and Gracie!

Now, please do not forget that I am doing this work, as you say - single handed, and when it comes to the real battle, after the Park is established, I may need the moral support of some of those for whose reputation I have been working - and, in such case, I shall be glad, for the sake of justice, of any assistance you can give me or may be able to turn that way. I do not want to call on reserves as yet; but I want to have that reserve so strong that it will be able to vanquish any dishonesty or injustice that may be attempted.

By accident, I recently discovered that an account of my call upon Capt. Kellogg on Sept. 20, last, was published by the Coml. Gazette of Cincinnati of December 1st. The writer says then, that I belonged to the 14th Mo. Battery. The author is Col. Bailey of the 9th Ky. Do you know him? It is worth reading --- rich.

I beg your pardon for encroaching to such an extent on your time and strength.

I shall be most happy to hear from you at your convenience, I assure you.

Most respectfully,
G. E. Dolton.

MS 562: Introduction | Transcript List
MS 562 Series Description: MS 562: Introduction | 86th O.V.I. Records | Arnold McMahan Papers
MS 562 Abstracts: Part 1 (McMahan Correspondence) | Part 2 (Box 12) | Part 3 (Box 13) | Inventory
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