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U. S. in Wartime | NW Ohio in the Civil War | List of Indexed Newspapers
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User's Guide to the Index of the World War I Letters to the Newspapers of Northwest Ohio
By Daniel A. Masters
May 22, 2008
For previous users of the index to the Civil War letters of northwest Ohio hosted by the Center for Archival Collections at
Bowling Green State University, the layout and logic of this index to the World War I letters will be both familiar and understood.
However, with the evolution of military thought and organization there are a number of changes which occurred in the intervening
years of 1865-1917 that require a bit of explanation.
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Above, 5th Company, 302nd Supply Train, 77th Division, at Camp Upton, New York, ca. 1917.
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The indices are laid out in a two part fashion; part one consists of a listing of correspondents in alphabetical order, giving
their complete service record, culled from the roster published by the state of Ohio in the 1920s, followed by a list of dates
in which their letters appeared. Note that the dates listed are the dates that the letters appeared in their respective newspapers,
not the dates that the letters were written. Improvements in communications sped the mails considerably from the time of the
Civil War, but the majority of these letters were written in France or Italy and hence took some time to cross the Atlantic.
Part two consists of the actual index of the newspaper showing letters by the dates they appeared in the newspaper. The listing
consists of the soldier and rank (if known), unit assigned to, place of writing, the date written (if known), and the page
or pages on which the letter appeared. Oftentimes, the newspapers would head soldiers' correspondence with phrases such as
"From Over There," in reference to the popular song of the time, "Over There." In addition to soldiers' correspondence, articles
giving details of a soldier's experience in the military are also noted, including obituaries. These articles often contain
letters either from the soldier himself or from comrades in arms imparting information about him.
An important difference between correspondence during the First World War and the Civil War is the issue of censorship. During
the Civil War, soldiers were generally allowed (with a few notable exceptions) complete freedom to write home what they wished,
within the bounds of military propriety. Private soldiers generally were not privy to plans or operations concocted by their
officers so it was generally understood that allowing them that freedom of expression was permissible. However, by the outbreak
of World War I, improvements in communication technology and the apparent threat of sabotage by German agents (the Black Tom
explosion in New Jersey in 1916 is a fine example) had convinced the military authorities that establishing some semblance
of control over soldiers' correspondence was both crucial and prudent.
Initially, letters that appeared in Wood County's newspapers through the end of 1917 were generally free of censorship, naming
names and places at regularity as well as giving insight into the growing pains of the American Army. With the steadily increasing
presence of combat personnel on the European continent in the fall of 1917 and the ever present U-boat threat off the eastern
shores of the United States, it was announced that censorship henceforth would be a regular activity of the officer corps.
Censorship was not, however, rigidly enforced across the board. A few newspapers (the Perrysburg Journal in particular) took
this announcement to its logical conclusion and for many months did not publish a single letter. Other newspapers published
anything they could, although the letters sometimes were evasive in describing locations, and other information which was
considered of primary military value.
But to believe that censorship took away from the value of this correspondence in understanding the activities and feelings
of our World War I veterans would be overstating the case. The depth of operational detail does suffer somewhat, but this
deficiency is more than made up for by the literary style and in depth descriptions contained herein. With the signing of
the Armistice, censorship restrictions were lifted quickly and the Wood County newspapers were replete with letters detailing
the summer and fall campaigns of 1918; battles such as the Marne, Chateau Thierry, the St. Mihiel salient, the Meuse-Argonne
offensive, and the final campaigns in Belgium.
But Wood County soldiers not only served in the Army ground forces in large numbers, they also served in the U.S. Navy, the
Marine Corps, and in surprising numbers in the Army's Air Service. Of particular note is a series of letters from members
of the band of the battleship U.S.S. Indiana which give a detailed, if somewhat whimsical, look at life aboard a naval vessel
at war. Each letter makes for fascinating reading once placed into its proper context, and once the soldier and his unit can
be placed within the scope of the larger whole. To this end, an order of battle has been provided which will give some guidance
in this regard.
The bulk of the correspondence detailed here emanates from soldiers serving the U.S. Army. Unlike the Civil War where the
primary organizational element was the regiment, during the First World War soldiers identified themselves more with their
divisions. Whereas during the Civil War, a regiment may move from division to division several times during the course of
the war, World War I divisions were far more rigid in their organization. For example, the 37th Division which was composed
almost entirely of Ohio men consisted of the 145th, 146th, 147th, and 148th Infantry Regiments throughout its entire service.
This being the case, efforts were made to include divisional information where possible to facilitate use of the collection
and to make the task of contextual application easier for the end user.
An American Army division in World War I consisted of 4 infantry regiments, 3 machine gun battalions, 3 field artillery battalions,
a divisional headquarters troop, and associated divisional units including engineers, a field signal battalion, military police
battalion, ammunition train, supply train, a sanitary train that consisted of medical personnel, and, in some divisions, veterinary
and mechanical repair units. These units were further organized into brigades, which acted semi-independently in the field.
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Layout of a Typical World War I Division
Using the 37th "Buckeye" Division once again as a reference, here is the layout of a typical World War I division:
37th Division
Headquarters Troop
134th Machine Gun Battalion, motorized (4 companies)
73rd Infantry Brigade
145th Infantry Regiment (12 companies)
146th Infantry Regiment (12 companies)
135th Machine Gun Battalion (4 companies)
74th Infantry Brigade
147th Infantry Regiment (12 companies)
148th Infantry Regiment (12 companies)
136th Machine Gun Battalion (4 companies)
62nd Field Artillery Brigade
134th Field Artillery Regiment (6 batteries)
135th Field Artillery Regiment (6 batteries)
136th Field Artillery Regiment (6 batteries)
112th Trench Mortar Battery (3 platoons)
Other Divisional troops:
112th Engineers Battalion (6 companies)
112th Engineer Train (1 company)
112th Field Signal Battalion (4 companies)
112th Ammunition Train (4 truck companies)
112th Supply Train (6 truck companies)
112th Military Police Battalion (2 companies)
112th Sanitary Train (10 companies)
114th Mobile Veterinary Unit
Organization at the regimental level changed somewhat from the Civil War as well. Whereas Civil War regiments (usually) consisted
of ten companies in two battalions, First World War regiments consisted of twelve companies in three battalions. The companies
themselves were substantially larger as well: Civil War companies usually consisted of no more than 100 men, First World War
line companies often consisted of 250 men. First World War regiments also had additional personnel in a headquarters company,
a supply company, a band, a sappers and bombers platoon, a pioneer platoon, an orderly section with troops in the field telephone
and radio services, and attached machine gun company. As such, First World War regiments consisted of nearly 4,000 men, four
times as large as a Civil War regiment, offering far greater offensive and servicing capabilities.
Organizational Chart, 145th Infantry Regiment, 37th Division
At the risk of being tedious, included below is a detailed organizational chart for the 145th Infantry Regiment, 37th Division:
145th Infantry Regiment (112 officers, 3,720 enlisted men) consisting of:
Headquarters Section, consisting of 336 men divided into:
Band Section (49 men)
Signal Platoon (76 men in three organizations)
Sappers and Bombers Platoon (48 men)
Pioneer Platoon (54 men)
One pounder gun platoon
First Section (42 men)
Orderly Section (29 men)
Supply Company, 145th Infantry Regiment (168 men)
Machine Gun Company (178 men)
12 Line Companies A-B-C-D-E-F-G-H-I-K-L-M
Each company consisting of 6 officers, 250 enlisted men
20 enlisted men in company headquarters section
Four platoons, each with a headquarters section with a lieutenant, sergeant and four privates, and 58 enlisted men
Each platoon was further divided into four sections:
First section, 12 hand bombers under the command of two corporals
Second section, 9 men in rifle grenadiers
Third Section, 17 men as riflemen
Fourth Section, 15 as automatic riflemen
As is readily apparent, the organization of a typical First World War regiment was a vastly more complicated affair than was
typical in the Civil War. It is important to note that the numbers cited above as per the War Department's published tables
of organization; units in the field rarely if ever reached these totals, but this will give the reader some semblance of the
size and complexity of these organizations. Once again, this is included not to add unwarranted detail to this guide, but
to provide some organizational reference to which the end user can place these letters within a proper contextual format.
Service Records
As to deciphering service records, below is an example typical from the guide:
Lee W. Hiser
95430, Pemberville, Ohio, age 21 2/12 yrs., born in Pemberville, Ohio, white, enlisted May 4, 1917 at Oak Harbor, Ohio in
Co. M, 6th Infantry, Ohio National Guard, transferred to Co. M, 166th Infantry, 42nd Division, promoted to Private First Class
January 20, 1918, promoted to Corporal July 16, 1918, service with A.E.F. October 29, 1917-April 7, 1919, service at Champagne-Marne,
Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne, and Defensive Sector, slightly wounded October 14, 1918, honorable discharge April
25, 1919.
Letters: December 20, 1917, March 7, 1918, June 6, 1918, October 3, 1918
The information included above is organized thus: serial number (assigned by Army and usually printed on soldiers items of
clothing or personal equipment), residence and/or address at time of enlistment, age or birthdate and birthplace, race, enlistment
record and initial unit, record of promotions, transfers, service overseas with American Expeditionary Force, combat service
record by campaigns, wound record with date, discharge or final status. /p>
This information differs little from what is included in the state roster, except that the roster's often bewildering collection
of abbreviations have been spelled out to facilitate understanding, and the additional inclusion of divisional information
for contextual reference.
Every effort was made to identify the correspondents as thoroughly as possible, but inevitably in a work such as this, errors
will occur and for which the end user has my sincere apologies. A list has been provided which lists the correspondents for
the entire collection by unit within the divisional reference.
List of Campaigns
The following list of campaigns from the U.S. Army Military History Branch will be of assistance in beginning to understand
the various battles and engagements in which these soldiers participated:
Cambrai, 20 November - 4 December 1917
The year that America entered the war was marked by near disaster for the Allies on all the European fronts. A French offensive
in April, with which the British cooperated, was a failure, and was followed by widespread mutinies in the French armies.
The British maintained strong pressure on their front throughout the year; but British attacks on the Messines Ridge (7 June),
at Ypres (31 July), and at Cambrai (20 November) failed in their main objective-the capture of German submarine bases-and
took a severe toll of British fighting strength. Three American engineer regiments-the 11th, 12th, and 14th-were engaged in
construction activity behind the British lines at Cambrai in November, when they were unexpectedly called upon to go into
the front lines during an emergency. They thus became the first A.E.F. units to meet the enemy.
Somme Defensive, 21 March - 6 April 1918
The German high command decided to attack on the British-held Somme front in the direction of Amiens. A breakthrough at this
point would separate the French from the British, push the latter into a pocket in Flanders, and open the way to the Channel
ports.
The offensive began on 21 March 1918 with three German armies (about 62 divisions in all) in the assault. British defense
lines were pierced in rapid succession. By 26 March Amiens was seriously threatened, and on the following day a gap was created
between the French and British armies. But the Germans lacked reserves to exploit their initial phenomenal successes, and
the Allies moved in enough reserves to bring the offensive to a halt by 6 April. The Germans had advanced up to 40 miles,
had captured 1,500 square miles of ground and 70,000 prisoners, and had inflicted some 200,000 casualties. They had failed,
however, to achieve any or their strategic objectives; destruction of the British, disruption of Allied lateral communicational
and capture of Amiens.
On 25 March 1918, at the height at the German drive, Pershing placed the four American divisions at that time ready for combat
at the disposal of the French. But only a few American units were engaged. They included the 6th, 12th, and 14th Engineers
and the 17th, 22d, and 148th Aero Squadrons, a total of about 2200 men.
Lys, 9 - 27 April 1918
Ludendorff still hoped to destroy the hard-hit British Army before it had a chance to recover from the effects of the Somme
drive. This was the purpose of a new German attack launched on 9 April 1918 on a narrow front along the Lys River in Flanders.
The Germans committed 46 divisions to the assault, and, using Hutier attacks once again, quickly scored a breakthrough. The
British situation was desperate for some days. Haig issued his famous "backs to the wall" order and appealed to Foch for reinforcements.
But the Allied Supreme Commander, convinced that the British could hold their line, refused to commit reserves he was building
up in anticipation of the day when the Allies would again be able to seize the initiative. Foch's judgment proved to be correct,
and Ludendorff called off the offensive on 29 April.
Since 21 March the Germans had suffered some 350,000 casualties without having attained any vital objectives; in the same
period British casualties numbered about 305,000. About 500 Americans participated in the campaign, including troops of the
16th Engineers, 28th Aero Squadron, and 1st Gas Regiment.
Aisne 27 May - 5 June 1918
The next major German attack fell on 27 May on the thinly held but formidable terrain along the Aisne River known as the Chemin
des Dames. The original objective of this new offensive was to draw southward the Allied reserves accumulated back of the
British sector, in preparation for a final German attempt to destroy the British Army in Flanders. The French and British
defenders were taken completely by surprise, and their positions were overrun rapidly on a forty-mile front. German progress
on the first day was so rapid (advances up to 13 miles were made at some points) that Ludendorff altered his plans and decided
to make the diversionary attack a main effort. Most of the Aisne bridges were captured intact. The thrust toward Rheims failed
but Soissons was taken, and by 31 May the Germans had reached the outskirts of Chateau-Thierry on the Marne, less than 40
miles from Paris.
In the next few days the Germans sought to exploit and expand the deep and exposed salient which they had established. But
by 4 June they had been stopped everywhere. Some 27,500 American troops took part in the check of the German advance. The
3d Division foiled enemy attempts in the period 1-4 June to secure a firm bridgehead across the Marne at Chateau-Thierry.
West of the town the 2d Division, which included a Marine brigade, defended the road to Paris, and on 6 June successfully
counterattacked in Belleau Wood.
Montdidier-Noyon, 9 - 13 June 1918
Ludendorff followed up his stalled Aisne offensive with a small-scale drive in the Montdidier-Noyon sector on 9 June 1918.
Twenty-one German division attacked the French on a twenty-three mile front extending from Montdidier to the Oise River. The
French anticipated the assault and contained it after a nine-mile penetration by the Germans, counterattacking strongly. The
fighting was over by 12 June, and the enemy had little to show for the heavy losses incurred. No large American units were
in the immediate vicinity of this action, although the 1st Division at Cantigny was subjected to artillery fire and diversionary
raids.
Champagne-Marne, 15 - 18 July 1918
In the four great offensives from 21 March to 13 June 1918 the Germans gained considerable ground, but failed to achieve a
decisive advantage at any point on the front. Furthermore, success was bought at a price in manpower and material which they
could ill afford. Their more then 600,000 casualties were irreplaceable, whereas the Allied loss of some 800,000 men was soon
more than compensated for by new American units arriving at the front in ever-mounting numbers. By July 1918 Allied troops
outnumbered German on the Western Front. Other factors also contributed to the decline of German morale, notably the pinch
of the blockade and the effectiveness of the Allied propaganda, which was distributed widely by air at the front and in German
cities behind the lines. But Ludendorff refused to consider peace negotiations, and planned two more offensives for July which
he hoped would bring victory. The first of the new drives was designed to capture Rheims, to make more secure the supply of
the Merge salient, and to draw in Allied reserves. The second and larger offensive, destined never to be launched, would strike
once again at the British in Flanders.
When the two-pronged German assault on either side of Rheims began on 15 July the Allies were prepared for it. Plans for the
attack had leaked out of Berlin, and Allied airplanes had detected the unusual activity behind the enemy front. Foch had time
to draw up reserves, and Petain, the French commander, skillfully deployed his troops in defense-in-depth tactics. Consequently
the German drive east of Rheims fell far short of its objective. The attack west of the city succeeded in pushing across the
Marne near Chateau-Thierry, but was checked there by French and American units. Among the A.E.F. units involved in this action
were the 3d, 26th, 28th, and 42d Divisions, the 369th Infantry, and supporting elements (in all about 85,000 Americans). It
was here that the 38th Infantry of the 3d Division gained its motto, "Rock of the Marne."
By 17 July the Champagne-Marne offensive had petered out and the initiative passed to the Allies. The German people had built
up great hopes for the success of this Friedensturm (peace offensive); its failure was a tremendous psychological blow to
the whole nation.
Aisne-Marne, 18 July - 6 August 1918
Several days before the Germans launched their abortive Champagne-Marne drive, the French high command had made plans for
a general converging offensive against the Marne salient. Petain issued orders on 12 July for the attack to begin on the 18th,
with five French armies-the Tenth, Sixth, Ninth, Fifth, and Fourth, placed around the salient from left to right-taking part.
Spearheading the attack were the five divisions of the French XX Corps (Tenth Army), including the American 1st and 2d Divisions.
Early on 18 July the two American divisions and a French Moroccan division, jumping off behind a heavy barrage, launched the
main blow at the northwest base of the salient near Soissons. Enemy frontline troops, taken by surprise, initially gave ground,
although resistance stiffened after an Allied penetration of some three miles. Before the 1st and 2d Divisions were relieved
(on 19 and 22 July respectively) they had advanced 6 to 7 miles, made Soissons untenable for the enemy, and captured 6,500
prisoners at a cost of over 10,000 American casualties.
Meanwhile the other French armies in the offensive also made important gains, and the German commander ordered a general retreat
from the Marne salient. The French Sixth Army, on the right of the Tenth, advanced steadily from the southwest, reaching the
Vesle River on 3 August. By 28 Judy this army included the American 3d, 4th, 28th, and 42d Divisions. The 4th and 42d Divisions
were under control of the I Corps, the first American corps headquarters to participate in combat. On 4 August the American
III Corps headquarters entered combat, taking control of the 28th and 32d Divisions (the latter had relieved the 3d Division
in the line on 29 July). By 5 August the entire Sixth Army front was held by the two American corps. East of the Sixth Army
the French Ninth and Fifth Armies also advanced into the salient. The Germans retired across the Aisne and Vesle Rivers, resolutely
defending each strong point as they went.
By 6 August the Aisne-Marne Offensive was over. The threat to Paris was ended by wiping out the Marne salient. The initiative
now had definitely passed to the Allies, ending any possibility that Ludendorff could carry out his planned offensive in Flanders.
Moreover, the success of the offensive revealed the advantages of Allied unity of command and the fighting qualities of American
units. The eight A.E.F. divisions (1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32d, 42d) in the action had spearheaded much of the advance,
demonstrating offensive capabilities that helped to inspire new confidence in the war-weary Allied armies. About 270,000 Americans
took part in the battle.
On 24 July, while the Aisne-Marne drive was under way, Foch had outlined his plans for the remainder of 1918 at the only conference
of Allied commanders that he called during the war. He proposed that the immediate objective of the Allied offensive should
be the reduction of the three main German salients (Marne, Amiens, St. Mihiel), with the goal of improving lateral communications
behind the front in preparation for a general offensive in the fall. Reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was assigned to Pershing
at his own request.
The excellent showing made by American troops in the Aisne-Marne Offensive gave Pershing an opportunity to press again for
the formation of an independent American army. Preliminary steps in the organization of the American First Army had been taken
in early July 1918. On the 4th Lt. Col. Hugh A. Drum was selected as chief of staff and directed to begin establishment of
army headquarters. After conferences on 10 and 21 July, Foch agreed on the 22d to the formal organization of the First Army,
and to the formation of two American sectors-a temporary combat sector in the Chateau-Thierry region, where the already active
I and III Corps could comprise the nucleus of the First Army, and a quiet sector farther east, extending from Nomeny (east
of the Moselle) to a point north of St. Mihiel-which would become the actual theater of operations for the American Army as
soon as circumstances permitted concentration of A.E.F. divisions there. Orders issued on 24 July announced formal organization
of the First Army, effective on 10 August; designated Pershing as its commander; and located its headquarters at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre,
west of Chateau-Thierry.
Stabilization of the Vesle River front in early August led Pershing to alter his plane for forming the First Army. Instead
of organizing it in the Chateau-Thierry region and then moving it eastward for the St. Mihiel Offensive, he secured Foch's
consent on 9 August to a build-up of First Army units in the vicinity of the St. Mihiel salient. Tentative plans for reduction
of the salient called for the concentration of three American corps (about 14 American and 3 French divisions) on a front
extending from Port-sur-Seille westward around the bulge to Watronville. Three American divisions would remain on the Vesle
front.
Meanwhile Allied forces, including American units operating in other sectors of the Western Front, were making significant
gains in the preliminary phases of the great final offensives. For the sake of clarity, the role of American units in the
Somme Offensive (8 August11 November), Oise-Aisne (18 August-11 November), and Ypres-Lys (19 August-11 November) Campaigns
will be described briefly, before considering in more detail the activities of the main body of A.E.F. troops in the St. Mihiel
(12-16 September) and Meuse-Argonne (26 September-11 November) Campaigns.
Somme Offensive, 8 August - 11 November 1918
On 8 August the British began limited operations with the objective of flattening the Amiens salient. This attack marked the
beginning of the great Somme Offensive, which continued until hostilities ceased on 11 November. The British Fourth Army,
including the American 33d and 80th Divisions, struck the northwestern edge of the salient in coordination with a thrust by
the French First Army from the southwest. No artillery barrage preceded the attack to forewarn the enemy. Some 600 tanks spearheaded
the British assault, which jumped off during the thick fog. The completely surprised Germans quickly gave up 16,000 prisoners
as their positions were overrun. Ludendorff himself characterized 8 August as the "Black Day of the German Army." The Germans
were forced to fal1 back to the old 1915 line, where they reorganized strong defenses-in-depth. Haig then shifted his attack
farther north to the vicinity of Arras on 21 August, forcing the Germans to withdraw toward the Hindenburg Line. By the end
of the month they had evacuated the whole of the Amiens salient.
The drive to breach the main Hindenburg Line began at the end of September. The American II Corps (27th and 30th Divisions),
forming part of the British Fourth Army, attacked the German defenses along the line of the Cambrai-St. Quentin Canal, capturing
heavily fortified Bony and Bellicourt on the 29th. By 5 October the offensive had broken through the Hindenburg Line, and
the Allied forces advanced through open country to the Oise-Somme Canal (19 October). During this phase of the operations
the 27th and 30th Divisions alternated in the line. When the American II Corps was relieved on 21 October, it had served 26
days in the line and suffered 11,500 casualties.
The British advance in the Somme region continued until the Armistice, constituting the northern arm of Foch's great pincers
movement on the Germans' vital lateral rail communications system. The key junction at Aulnoye, southwest of Maubeuge, was
reached on 5 November. A total of about 54,000 Americans participated in the Somme Campaign.
Oise-Aisne, 18 August - 11 November 1918
In mid-August the French started a series of drives on their front, which extended about 90 miles from Reims westward through
Soissons to Ribecourt on the Oise River. These operations continued into late September, when they merged into Foch's great
final offensive of October-November. Five French armies (from right to left the Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, Third, and First) advanced
abreast, in coordination with the British on the Somme to the north and the Americans to the east.
The American 32d Division was a part of the French Tenth Army, which spearheaded the penetration of the enemy's main line
on 22 August. The 32d was instrumental in the capture of Juvigny on 30 August, which secured tactically important high ground
for the Allies. The German front was so badly breached that the enemy was compelled to abandon the Vesle River line. On 9
September the 32d Division was ordered east to join the American First Army.
The American III Corps (28th and 77th Divisions) was a part of the French Sixth Army east of Soissons, which held in late
August the western part of the Vesle River sector extending from Braine to Courlandon. As the Germans retired from the Vesle
northward to the Aisne valley in early September, the III Corps took part in the aggressive pursuit operations. Its two divisions
carried out successful local attacks, but failed to break into the German line before they were relieved to join the American
First Army-the 28th on 7-8 September and the 77th on 14-16 September.
No American divisions participated in the subsequent Oise-Aisne operations, which by 11 November had carried the French armies
to the Belgian border. A total of about 85,000 Americans took part in the Oise-Aisne Campaign.
Ypres-Lys 19 August - 11 November 1918
That part of the Western Front extending from the English Channel south through Ypres, and thence across the Lye River to
the vicinity of Arras, was manned by an army group under King Albert of Belgium composed of Belgian, British, and French armies.
In late August and early September the British Second and Fifth Armies, assisted by the American II Corps (27th and 30th Divisions),
wiped out the Lys salient. When the Germans began retiring in the sector south of the Lys in October to shorten their lines,
King Albert's army group attacked along its entire front. By 20 October Ostend and Bruges had been captured and the Allied
left was at the Dutch frontier. In mid-October Pershing dispatched two American divisions-the 37th and 91st-to the French
Army of Belgium, at Foch's request, to give impetus to the drive to cross the Scheldt (Escaut) southwest of Ghent. A general
attack began in this area on 31 October and continued intermittently until hostilities ended on 11 November. The 37th Division
forced a crossing of the river southeast of Heurne on 2 November and another farther north at the site of the destroyed Hermelgem-Syngem
bridge on 10 November. Casualties of the two divisions in these operations totaled about 2,600. From 19 August to 11 November
about 108,000 Americans participated in the Ypres-Lys Campaign.
St. Mihiel, 12 - 16 September 1918
By September 1918, with both the Marne and the Amiens salients eliminated, there remained but one major threat to lateral
rail communications behind the Allied lines-the old St. Mihiel salient near the Paris-Nancy line. Active preparations for
its reduction began with the transfer of Headquarters First Army, effective 13 August, from La Ferté-sous-Jouarre in the Marne
region to Neufchateau on the Meuse, immediately south of St. Mihiel. On 28 August the first echelon of headquarters moved
closer to the front at Ligny-en-Barrois.
American unite from Flanders to Switzerland were shifted into the area near the salient. The fourteen American and four French
divisions assigned to the First Army for the operation contained ample infantry and machinegun units for the attack. But because
of the earlier priority given to shipment of infantry (at the insistence of the British and French) the First Army was short
of artillery, tank, air and other support units essential to a well-balanced field army. The French made up this deficiency
by loaning Pershing over half the artillery and nearly half the airplanes and tanks needed for the St. Mihiel operation.
Shortly before the offensive was to begin, Foch threatened once again to disrupt Pershing's long-held desire to carry out
a major operation with an independent American force. On 30 August the Allied Commander in Chief proposed to exploit the recently
gained successes on the Aisne-Marne and Amiens fronts by reducing the size of the St. Mihiel attack and dividing the American
forces into three groups-one for the salient offensive and two for fronts to the east and west of the Argonne Forest. Pershing,
however, remained adamant in his insistence that the First Army should not now be broken up, no matter where it might be sent
into action. Fina1ly a compromise was reached. The St. Mihiel attack was subordinated to the much larger offensive to be launched
on the Meuse-Argonne front in late September, but the First Army remained intact. Pershing agreed to limit his operations
by employing only the minimum force needed to reduce the salient in three or four days. Simultaneously he was to prepare his
troops for a major role in the Meuse-Argonne drive.
The St. Mihiel offensive began on 12 September with a threefold assault on the salient. The main attack was made against the
south face by two American corps. On the right was the I Corps (from right to left the 82d, 90th, 5th, and 2d Divisions in
line with the 78th in reserve) covering a front from Pont-à-Mousson on the Moselle westward to Limey; on the left, the IV
Corps (from right to left the 89th, 42d, and 1st Divisions in line with the 3d in reserve) extending along a front from Limey
westward to Marvoisin. A secondary thrust was carried out against the west face along the heights of the Meuse, from Mouilly
north to Haudimont, by the V Corps (from right to left the 26th Division, the French 15th Colonial Division, and the 8th Brigade,
4th Division in line with the rest of the 4th in reserve). A holding attack against the apex, to keep the enemy in the salient,
was made by the French II Colonial Corps (from right to left the French 39th Colonial Division, the French 26th Division,
and the French 2d Cavalry Division in line). In First Army reserve were the American 35th, 80th, and 91st Divisions.
Tota1 Allied forces involved in the offensive numbered more than 650,000-some 550,000 American and 100,000 Allied (mostly
French) troops. In support of the attack the First Army had over 3,000 guns, 400 French tanks, and 1,500 airplanes. Col. William
Mitchell directed the heterogeneous air force, composed of British, French, Italian, Portuguese, and American units, in what
proved to be the largest single air operation of the war. American squadrons flew 609 of the airplanes, which were mostly
of French or British manufacture.
Defending the salient was German "Army Detachment C," consisting of eight divisions and a brigade in the line and about two
divisions in reserve. The Germans, now desperately short of manpower, had begun a step-by-step withdrawal from the salient
only the day before the offensive began. The attack went so well on 12 September that Pershing ordered a speedup in the offensive.
By the morning of 13 September the 1st Division, advancing from the east, joined hands with the 26th Division, moving in from
the west, and before evening all objectives in the salient had been captured. At this point Pershing halted further advances
so that American units could be withdrawn for the coming offensive in the Meuse-Argonne sector.
This first major operation by an American Army under its own command took 16,000 prisoners at a cost of 7,000 casualties,
eliminated the threat of an attack on the rear of Allied fortifications at Nancy and Verdun, greatly improved Allied lateral
rail communications, and opened the way for a possible future offensive to seize Metz and the Briey iron fields.
Meuse-Argonne, 26 September - 11 November 1918
At the end of August Marshal Foch had submitted plane to the national commanders for a final offensive along the entire Western
Front, with the objective of driving the enemy out of France before winter and ending the war in the spring of 1919. The basis
for his optimism was the success of Allied attacks all along the front in August. Furthermore, he pointed out, the Allies
already had active operations in progress between the Moselle and Meuse, the Oise and Aisne, and on the Somme and Lys Rivers.
Foch acknowledged that the Germans could stave off immediate defeat by an orderly evacuation combined with destruction of
materiel and communications. Therefore the overall aim of the fall offensive would be to prevent a step-by-step enemy retirement.
As Foch anticipated, the Germans eventually contributed to the success of his strategy. Their High Command could not bring
itself to sacrifice the huge stores collected behind the front lines, and so delayed the withdrawal of its armies.
Foch's great offensive, planned to begin in the last week of September, called for a gigantic pincers movement with the objective
of capturing Aulnoye and Mézières, the two key junctions in the lateral rail system behind the German front. Lose of either
of these junctions would hamper seriously the German withdrawal. Despite grumbling from the English that they lacked the necessary
manpower, a chiefly British army was assigned the teak of driving toward Aulnoye. The A.E.F. was designated for the southern
arm of the pincers, the thrust on Mézières. Simultaneously the Belgian-French-British army group in Flanders would drive toward
Ghent, and the French armies in the Oise-Aisne region would exert pressure all along their front to lend support to the pincers
attack. .
Pershing decided to strike his heaviest blow in a zone about 20 miles wide between the Heights of the Meuse on the east and
the western edge of the high, rough, and densely wooded Argonne Forest. This is difficult terrain, broken by a central north-south
ridge that dominates the valleys of the Meuse and Aire Rivers. Three heavily fortified places-Montfaucon, Cunel, and Barricourt-as
well as numerous strong points barred the way to penetration of the elaborate German defenses in depth that extended behind
the entire front. This fortified system consisted of three main defense lines backed up by a fourth line less well-constructed.
Pershing hoped to launch an attack with enough momentum to drive through these lines into the open area beyond, where his
troops could then strike at the exposed German flanks and, in a coordinated drive with the French Fourth Army coming up on
the left, could cut the Sedan- Mézières railroad.
The task of assembling troops in the concentration area between Verdun and the Argonne was complicated by the fact that many
American unite were currently engaged in the St. Mihiel battle. Some 600,000 Americans had to be moved into the Argonne sector
while 220,000 French moved out. Responsibility for solving this tricky logistical problem fell to Col. George C. Marshall,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), First Army. In the ten-day period after St. Mihiel the necessary troop movements
were accomplished, but many untried divisions had to be placed in the vanguard of the attacking forces.
On the 20-mile Meuse-Argonne front where the main American attack w to be made, Pershing disposed three corps side by side,
each with three divisions in line and one in corps reserve. In the center was the V Corps (from right to left the 79th, 37th,
and 91st Divisions with the 32d in reserve), which would strike the decisive blow. On the right was the III Corps (from right
to left the 33d, 80th, and 4th Divisions with the 3d in reserve), which would move up the west aide of the Meuse. On the left
was the I Corps (from right to left the 35th, 28th, and 77th Divisions with the 92d in reserve), which would advance parallel
to the French Fourth Army on its left. Eastward across the Meuse the American front extended in direct line some 60 miles;
this sector was held by two French Corps (IV and II Colonial) and the American IV Corps in the St. Mihiel sector. Pershing
had available to support his offensive nearly 4000 guns, two-thirds manned by American artillerymen; 190 light French tanks,
mostly with American personnel; and some 820 aircraft, 600 of them flown by Americans.
The Meuse-Argonne Offensive falls into three phases. During the initial phase (26 September-3-October) the First Army advanced
through most of the southern Meuse-Argonne region, captured enemy strong points, seized the first two German defense lines,
and then stalled before the third line. Failure of tank support, a difficult supply situation, and the inexperience of American
troops all contributed to checking its advance.
In the second phase (4-31 October) the First Army, after the inexperienced divisions had been replaced by veteran units, slowly
ground its way through the third German line. The enemy was forced to throw in reserves, drawn from other parts of the front,
thus aiding the Allied advances elsewhere. In the face of a stubborn defense, American gains were limited and casualties were
severe, especially as a result of the newly devised enemy tactic of attacking frontline troops with airplanes. First Army
air unite retaliated with bombing raids which broke up German preparations for counterattacks. By the end of October the enemy
had been cleared from the Argonne and First Army troops were through the German main positions. Two notable incidents of this
phase of the campaign were the fight of the "Lost Battalion" of the 77th Division (2-7 October), and the feat of Corp. (later
Sgt.) Alvin C. York, who single-handedly killed 15 Germans and captured 132 on 8 October.
In mid-October the organization of the Second Army was completed, at Toul in the St. Mihiel sector, to provide means for better
control of the lengthening American front and solutions of the diverse tactical problems that it presented. Pershing assumed
command of the new army group thus formed.
Before the third and final phase (1-11 November) of the offensive got under way, many of the exhausted divisions of the First
Army were replaced, roads were built or repaired, supply was improved, and most Allied units serving with the A.E.F. were
withdrawn. On 1 November First Army units began the assault of the now strengthened German fourth line of defense. Penetration
was rapid and spectacular. The V Corps in the center advanced about six miles the first day, compelling the German units west
of the Meuse to withdraw hurriedly. On 4 November the III Corps forced a crossing of the Meuse and advanced northeast toward
Montmédy. Elements of the V Corps occupied the heights opposite Sedan on 7 November, thus finally accomplishing the First
Army's chief mission-denial of the Sedan- Mézières railroad to the Germans. Marshal Foch, at this juncture, shifted the First
Army left boundary eastward so that the French Fourth Army might capture Sedan, which had fallen to the Prussians in 1870.
American units were closing up along the Mouse and, east of the river, were advancing toward Montmédy, Briny, and Metz, when
hostilities ended on 11 November.
General Pershing authorized the results of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, the greatest battle in American history up to that
time, in his Final Report: "Between September 26 and November 11, 22 American and 4 French divisions, on the front extending
from southeast of Verdun to the Argonne Forest, had engaged and decisively beaten 47 different German divisions, representing
25 percent of the enemy's entire divisional strength on the western front.
The First Army suffered a loss of about 117,000 in killed and wounded. It captured 26,000 prisoners, 847 cannon, 3,000 machineguns,
and large quantities of material." More than 1,200,000 Americans had taken part in the 47-day campaign.
Vittorio Veneto, 24 October - 4 November 1918
Late in the war, Americans participated on a limited scale in campaigns in Italy. The 332d Regiment (largely from Ohio) with
attached hospital troops was sent from the A.E.F. to the Italian Front in July 1918 for the morale effect which it was hoped
that the sight of Americana would have on the Italians. This force of about 1,200 men took part in the last great Italian
offensive against the Austrians, the Battle of Vittorio Veneto.
Further Information
Researchers desiring further information on military medals, awards, and decorations are encouraged to visit the following
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