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**The More Things Change the More they Stay the Same:
Mexican Naturalization Before and After Welfare Reform**

Kelly Stamper Balistreri

Jennifer Van Hook

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Center for Family and Demographic Research

Bowling Green State University

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ABSTRACT

During the last decade there has been a dramatic increase in the both the number and the

rate of Mexican naturalization. Some have interpreted this increase as a response to

changes in welfare and immigration policy surrounding the 1996 Personal Responsibility

and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PWRORA) which limited public assistance to

non-citizens, and the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act

(IIRIRA) which may have increased the incentive to naturalize by making it more

difficult for legal immigrants to sponsor their relatives for entry to the U.S. This paper

uses Current Population Survey data from 1994/95 and 2000/01 to examine how the

social and economic determinants of naturalization may have changed in order to provide

insight into which explanation for the increase in naturalizations is most relevant. We

find that while the proportion of Mexican immigrants who are naturalized increased

during the 1990s, their determinants have remained largely the same with the exception

that those with a noncitizen spouse and those who are not self-employed have become

more likely to be naturalized in the post-reform period. This suggests that a more

cautious interpretation about the relationship between the increase in naturalizations and

welfare and sponsorship restrictions be taken, particularly when regarding Mexican

immigrants.

INTRODUCTION

In 1990, just over 270 thousand immigrants became U.S citizens through naturalization. Six years later this figure increased dramatically to over 1 million with the proportion due to Mexican immigrants tripling—from 6.5 percent to 20.8 percent. In recent years this percentage has increased even further to just over 30% in FY 1999. Explanations for the increase in the number and proportion of Mexican naturalizations have varied. Some view the jump in naturalizations as a direct response to the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PWRORA or Welfare Reform), which limited noncitizens access to welfare benefits (Borjas 2002). Others interpret the increase as a response to changes in a broad range of immigration admission and social welfare policies that together may increase the economic and social costs of remaining a non-citizen, especially among Mexican immigrants. In particular, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 increased the number eligible to naturalize by granting legal permanent residence and requiring civics and English language classes to 2.3 million Mexican immigrants, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, may have increased the incentive to naturalize by making it more difficult for legal immigrants to sponsor their relatives for entry to the U.S (Massey, Durand and Malone 2002). Finally, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) attributes the increase in Mexican naturalizations not only to PWRORA and IRCA but also to programs such as the Citizenship USA Initiative and the Green Card Replacement Program—programs that made it easier for immigrants to apply for citizenship.

It is important to empirically evaluate these explanations because it may reveal possible changes in the type of immigrants who are becoming citizens and also might reveal something about the motivations of the immigrants themselves. Traditionally, naturalization is seen by many as a final measure of an immigrant's adaptation and participation into U.S society (Bernard 1936; Gordon 1964; DeSipio 1987). Economic adaptation to the United States, measured by high personal income, high levels of education and home or business ownership have been found to be associated with higher rates of naturalization (Portes and Curtis 1987; Yang 1994). In addition, immigrants who are married to a citizen spouse have been found to be much more likely to become naturalized citizens than those immigrants who are not married (Johnson, Reyes, Mameesh, and Barbour 1999). This suggests that having solid ties to the Unites States through home or business ownership, high income, and a U.S born spouse all increase the probability of naturalization (Alvarez 1987; Portes and Curtis 1987; Portes and Mozo 1985; and Johnson, et al. 2002).

If Welfare Reform is directly responsible for the increase in naturalizations, then naturalization may have taken on new meaning as it now determines eligibility for a variety of public assistance programs following the enactment of Welfare Reform. Subsequently, there may have been a shift in the incentives for different types of immigrants to become citizens—acquiring citizenship may no longer be an indicator of social and economic commitment to the U.S but rather has become more selective of welfare recipients, and in general, those who aim not to invest in the U.S but instead tend to draw from the public coffers. Or as Borjas (2002 p.383) puts it, "many immigrants

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will become citizens not because they want to fully participate in the U.S political and social systems, but because naturalization is required to receive welfare benefits."

In this study we examine how the social and economic determinants of naturalization have changed from the pre- to the post-Welfare Reform time period in order to provide insight into which explanation for the increase in naturalizations is most relevant. We find that while the proportion of Mexican immigrants who are naturalized increased during the 1990s, their determinants have remained largely the same with the exception that those with a noncitizen spouse and those who are not self-employed have become more likely then before to be naturalized.

DETERMINANTS OF NATURALIZATION

To be eligible to become a naturalized citizen, an alien has to be at least 18 years old, have legal status, and have resided in the United States for at least five years. Additional requirements are that the immigrant must demonstrate the ability to speak, read, and write English; he or she must also pass a test on U.S. government and history; and finally the immigrant must be of good moral character (for example, not have been convicted of a felony). Some aliens belonging to a special category are exempt from some of these requirements. For instance, the spouse of a U.S. citizen, children of U.S. citizens, or military personnel have a three-year residency requirement. In addition, minor children of aliens may become citizens when their parents naturalize.

Not everyone eligible to naturalize does so. As noted above, those with greater economic and social investment in the U.S are more likely to naturalize. While attitudes toward becoming an American citizen have been found to influence the decision to

naturalize (Garcia 1981; Alvarez 1987) structural factors including demographic and individual characteristics (Bernard, 1936; Barken and Khokhlov, 1980), and in more recent research, the characteristics of the sending and receiving countries (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1986; Portes and Mozo, 1985; Portes and Curtis, 1986; Yang, 1994) have been found to be important determinants of naturalization.

Changes in the rates at which immigrants naturalize may be linked to a reduction in the hassles related to the application procedure (lengthy applications process and prohibitive fees), through INS programs such as the Citizenship USA Initiative which resulted large increases in naturalizations during 1996, and the Green Card Replacement Program. This program began in 1992 and required legal permanent residents to replace their green cards with new more counterfeit-proof cards. The INS encouraged immigrants to apply for citizenship when they came in to receive their new cards and many chose to become citizens rather than apply for a new card. These changes may have sped up the number of naturalizations, but it is unlikely to have changed the type of people who naturalize.

EXPLANATIONS OF INCREASE

The Role of Welfare Reform

Recent changes in welfare immigration policy may lead to changes in the determinants of becoming a US citizen. Welfare Reform may have introduced incentives to naturalize because it ended many non-citizens' access to the wide range of public welfare benefits (Espenshade, Baraka, and Huber, 1997). This legislation created distinctions among immigrants such that some remained eligible for the same public

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benefits and services as other U.S. born citizens, while other immigrants were deemed ineligible for those benefits. The immigrants who could obtain help were those who already had become naturalized citizens, were refugees or asylees, or had entered the country prior to the 1996 enactment date and exhibited a 10-year work history. Those immigrants who entered after the enactment date were considered ineligible for federal programs such as Food Stamps and SSI, and were subjected to a five-year ban on state controlled benefits such as Medicaid and TANF until they become a citizen. The passage of Welfare Reform meant that many immigrants were restricted from a wide range of public programs such as TANF (Temporary Aid for Needy Families), SSI, and Medicaid unless they became naturalized citizens.

Since the enactment of this legislation, many of the benefits have been restored. Children, the elderly and disabled immigrants had food stamps and income restored with the balanced Budget Amendment of 1997, however most working-age adults and immigrants entering the country since the enactment of legislation remain ineligible for most federal assistance programs for at least five years. Even though pre-enactment immigrants would not have to naturalize to qualify for welfare, they may have done so anyway out of confusion, intimidation or fear that the policy may become more restrictive in the future.

In addition to creating a new incentive to naturalize, PRWORA resulted in much greater state-level variation in welfare policy. Before the passage of PRWORA the federal government determined immigrant eligibility for federal programs—immigrants had relatively the same access to public benefits as did natives. After passage of PWRORA, control was largely shifted to the states meaning that the states can bar non-

citizens from cash and medical assistance. While many states have taken the initiative to fill in the gaps left by Welfare Reform, there are still immigrants at risk (Morse et al., 1998; Zimmermann and Tumlin, 1999). Thus, the increased incentive to naturalize may not have occurred evenly across the United States, but rather may be stronger in states that did not provide substitute benefits.

Borjas (2002) argues that many immigrants are now naturalizing in response to Welfare Reform—that naturalization is just another 'hurdle' toward receiving public assistance. (VanHook and Bean 2003). His evidence revolves around two points—first, the naturalization rate rose from 42.2 before enactment (1994-95) to 52.6 after (1997-98); and second, he found a positive correlation between pre-reform welfare use and post-reform naturalization rates for various entry and country of origin cohorts. But Borjas' analysis uses groups as the unit of analysis and does not examine prior welfare use and subsequent naturalization for individuals.

Indeed, it is challenging to tell whether welfare recipients became more likely to naturalize following Welfare Reform with the available individual level cross sectional data. One might examine whether the relationship between welfare receipt and being a naturalized citizen increased after Welfare Reform was enacted. But the percentage of naturalized citizens among welfare recipients may have increased because recipients naturalized to get or remain on welfare—this is Borjas' explanation. Alternatively the percentage naturalized may have increased because non-citizens who did not naturalize became ineligible for welfare and were kicked off the roles. Longitudinal data from the Survey of Program Dynamics (SPD) that include repeated measures of citizenship and welfare receipt could be used to disentangle the relationship between welfare receipt and

naturalization. Unfortunately the SPD does not contain a large enough sample to sufficiently examine Mexican immigrants. Our strategy is to examine state-level welfare access for immigrants rather than individual-level welfare usage. Our reasoning is that if the increase in naturalizations is a result of increased restrictions in welfare eligibility for non-citizens, then the states with the most restrictive post-reform welfare policies would experience the largest increases in naturalization among the immigrants living in them.

The Role of Immigration Legislation

An alternative explanation for the increase in Mexican naturalizations is related to recent changes in US immigration and border enforcement policies. First, the legal changes may have lead to increases in the number who are eligible to naturalize. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 was meant to reduce illegal immigration by offering amnesty to undocumented farm workers, beefing up border enforcement, and imposing sanctions on employers who hired undocumented workers. The immigrants granted legal status under IRCA were required to take English-language and civics courses (two main components of the citizenship exam process), while those immigrants living as legal residents were not. Thus, under IRCA, 2.3 million Mexican immigrants were granted legal status, took the necessary classes to qualify, and became eligible for naturalization beginning in 1994.

Second, the legal changes may have increased the incentive to naturalize because they limited the rights of non-citizens to sponsor relatives for immigration. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 instituted stricter sponsor deeming procedures making it more costly for a legal permanent resident

to sponsor family member's migration to the US. (Massey, et al 2002). With the implementation of IIRIRA, naturalized citizens now have even more privileges in relation to legal permanent residents when sponsoring relatives. Given the past historical pattern of Mexican chain migration as a predominately economic strategy, this policy may have disproportionately increased the incentive to naturalize among Mexicans.

Third, both IRCA and IIRIRA contributed to the growth in the number of illegal migrants living in the U.S. IRCA increased the number of illegal Mexicans living in the US by making it easier for the family and friends of IRCA legalized immigrants to migrate to the US illegally (Massey and Espinosa 1997). IIRIRA increased border enforcement, which ironically did not appear to reduce the number of illegal migrants entering the country but instead reduced the frequency with which illegal migrants returned home. Thus, IIRIRA had the effect of turning a circulating pool of illegal migrants into a more permanent –and larger—settlement of 'temporary' illegal migrants, many of whom were ultimately joined by family members. The increasing number of Mexicans living illegally in the U.S., many of whom wish to be legalized through sponsorship by a legally-resident family member, probably added to the pressure to naturalize among legally resident Mexicans.

Prior research has shown that in the past, immigrants have responded to changes in immigration and admissions rules. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990) demonstrate how the enactment of the 1965 family reunification admission criteria, which gave naturalized citizens more freedom to sponsor relatives for immigration than non-citizens, lead to increases in the number of naturalizations. If the recent increases in Mexican naturalization are in fact due to legislation that made it more difficult to sponsor relatives

then we would expect changes in the determinants of naturalization, particularly among those with non-citizen family members (i.e. those who are married to a non-citizen).

DATA AND METHODS

To examine and analyze the changes in determinants of naturalization we use data from the 1994, 1995, 2000 and 2001 Current Population Survey, Annual Demographic Files.[1] The CPS is a monthly survey of about 50,000 to 60,000 households, which is conducted by the Census Bureau for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Included in this file is information on economic and demographic characteristics for all persons in the household, but also country of birth, citizenship status, and year of entry. Our sample is limited to those immigrants born in Mexico who were at least 18 years old at the time of entry to the United States. A shortcoming of the CPS is that it does not identify legal status, that is, whether the immigrant respondent is a legal resident or is an unauthorized alien. We restrict our sample to those who would be eligible for naturalization by limiting it to those who had been in the US at least 5 years prior to the time of the survey. In order to obtain sufficient sample sizes, we pool the survey years as follows: 1994-95, and 2000-01.[2] The resulting sample size was as follows: 2,558 in 1994-5 and 3,246 in 2000-1.

Variables

Our multivariate analysis involves logistic regression modeling of the dependent variable—whether the individual was a naturalized citizen or not. The models include

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[1] The CPS files of 1994 and 1995, as released by the Census Bureau, suffer a problem with the sampling weights because race was defined inconsistently in the weighting process. To correct this problem, the CPS editing and weighting procedures were replicated as closely as possible to develop new weights for the October 1995 CPS that more accurately weight immigrants and the rest of the population (see Passel and Clark 1998 for details).

[2] Households in the CPS are interviewed for four consecutive months, out of the sample for 8 months, and then interviewed again for four consecutive months. For the years 1995 and 2001 we dropped those households that were in the fifth through eighth month of the survey in order to remove duplicates.

the following demographic, economic and state immigration and welfare policy variables:

Welfare Policy. An important component of this analysis concerns the impact of PWRORA and the differential access to public benefits based on citizenship status and state of residence. To address the influence of state-level variations in policy, we used data compiled by Tumlin, Zimmermann and Ost (1999) of the Urban Institute. These data contain state-level information on the various public assistance programs available to immigrants, as well as the corresponding eligibility requirements. Of primary interest to our analysis is the variable Safety Net Scale which measures immigrant's access to welfare benefits in the post-reform time period (ranges from 1 to 4 with 1 indicating the highest welfare access and 4 the lowest). The safety net scale score for the time period prior to Welfare Reform were all set to the high immigrant access because prior to the immigrant restrictions put in place by both PWRORA and IIRIRA there were no differences in access across states.

INS Processing Time. The time between filing out an application and taking the oath of citizenship can vary across INS district offices (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1997). To control for this variation, we created a measure of the probability that an application for naturalization would be completed in one year. To accomplish this we used Immigration and Naturalization Service data for each of the 33 INS district offices. These offices are responsible for conducting the written and verbal interview of the immigrant. The INS has data for each district office detailing the number of N-400's (citizenship applications) received, approved, denied, completed, and pending for each year between 1992 and 1999. To calculate the probability that the application was

completed in one year we divided the number of applications completed in a given year by the sum of the number completed in that year plus the number of applications that were pending or held over from the previous year. In order to obtain a general level of the completion probability for each office, we averaged the probability for the years 1996, 1997 and 1998. Each INS district office was then assigned a probability of completion. Respondents were assigned to the appropriate INS district office based on the MSA, county or state in which they lived at the time of the survey.

Economic Characteristics. Economic adaptation to the United States, measured by home or business ownership is associated with higher rates of naturalization (Portes and Curtis, 1987; Yang, 1994). Therefore we include variables indicating home ownership and self-employment (both incorporated and unincorporated) into the models. In addition, we include education level, measured as three categories (eighth grade or less, ninth to twelfth, and high school graduate), and poverty level measured as four categories (below 100% of the poverty line, 100-124%, 125-149% and 150% above the poverty line).

Demographic Characteristics. Because some research has shown that women have significantly higher rates of naturalization than men (Alvarez 1987; Yang 1994), and that the presence of children in the household significantly increases the propensity of naturalization (Portes and Curtis 1987) we include gender and the children in the household as dichotomous variables. Because the characteristics of immigrants may vary based on the year of entry to the US, we also include in the analysis a block of dichotomous variables representing a series of mutually exclusive year of entry cohorts

(immigrants who migrated prior to 1965 (the reference category) and between 1965-74, 1975-81, 1982-87, and after 1988).

RESULTS

In 1994/95 over fifteen percent of Mexican immigrants reported they were naturalized citizens. This figure increased to 18.4 percent by 1997/98, and to 24.8 percent by 2000/02. With the exception of a large increase in the proportion naturalized, the Mexican foreign-born population has not experienced major shifts in its composition or characteristics during the 1990s (Table 1). The population remained young, with only 10 percent aged 65 and older; and increasingly employed, 57 percent employed in 1994/95 and 61 percent in 2000/01. Along with low education levels (roughly 70 percent do not have a high school degree), the Mexican foreign-born population experienced high yet decreasing levels of poverty—falling from 31 percent in 1994/95 to 21 percent in 2000/01. In recent years, the proportion of the population that is women has increased slightly while the proportion of households with children (over 70 percent) remained relatively unchanged. Given that the characteristics of the Mexican foreign-born population have not changed much, it is unlikely that shifts in composition have lead to increases in naturalization.

Table 1 here

But have the increases in the percentage naturalized among certain groups, such as the poor and least educated, increased disproportionately? Table 2 provides the percentage naturalized among Mexican foreign-born for 1994/95, 2000/01 and the difference between years. In general, those with higher household incomes (150% or more above the poverty threshold), more years of education, the elderly, and those with a

naturalized spouse had higher levels of naturalization in both years. This corresponds

with previous research on naturalization that suggests those with social and economic

resources are more likely to naturalize (Yang, 1994; Evans, 1988; Garcia, 1981; Guest,

1980; Portes and Mozo, 1985; Portes and Curtis, 1987) and that length of time in the

country is associated with higher rates of naturalization. However, some changes have

occurred that suggest that welfare reform may have had an impact on the propensity to

naturalize.

<center>Table 2 here</center>

First, the poorest group of Mexican immigrants did experience an increase in the

proportion naturalized—those living 100 percent below the poverty line and those living

in near poverty (100 to 124 % of the poverty line) saw an increase in naturalizations of at

least seven percent. Second, although the proportion of Mexican foreign-born that were

naturalized did in fact double under the period under study, the increase was not

distributed evenly among states. In fact, the percentage of naturalized Mexicans doubled

from 12.4 percent in 1994/95 to 25.0 percent in 2000/01 in the states with the most

generous public benefits for immigrants. In contrast, for states that had the least generous

social welfare programs (a Safety Net Scale measure of 4) the actual proportion

naturalized was greater than that of high safety net states but change across time was

smaller. This could be interpreted as an indication of the impact of Welfare Reform, but

not in the predicted direction. If immigrants naturalized in response to a reduction in

eligibility for welfare, the greatest increases in naturalization would have occurred in the

least generous states, not in the most generous. However, these results do not take into

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account state fixed effects or for individual level characteristics. For that we turn to the multivariate results presented in Table 3.

Table 3 presents the odds ratios of logistics regression models of citizenship status. All four models pool data from 1994, 1995, 2000, and 2001 Current Population Surveys. The first two models estimate the average effects of various social and economic characteristics on citizenship status across all years in the pooled data file. The only exception is the Safety Net Scale, which is set to 1 for the pre-reform time period (1994/95) and varies from 1 to 4 in the post-reform period (2000/01). Thus, the effect of Safety Net is an estimate of the change in the effects of state welfare policy that were put in place only during the post-reform time period. Model 1 provides support for the idea that immigrants naturalize in order to secure the investment that they have made in the United States—those foreign-born who are homeowners and are self-employed are more likely to become a citizen than those who do not own a home and are not self-employed. In addition, those who have social ties to the US through marriage to a naturalized spouse and children in the household have higher odds of becoming a naturalized citizen. However, the effect of Safety Net Scale is negative and not significant, thus providing little support for the 'welfare reform' explanation for the increase in naturalization.

But the insignificant effect of the Safety Net Scale may be due to other state-level characteristics that are associated with the Safety Net Scale. To control for unmeasured state characteristics we include state fixed-effects into the model (Model 2). After holding constant personal and socioeconomic characteristics and INS processing time, and differences across states, the state-level indicator of immigrant welfare generosity becomes significant. This indicates that for each 1-unit increase in the safety net scale (1

is the highest, 4 is the lowest) there is a thirteen-percent decrease in the predicted odds of naturalization. In other words, as fewer provisions are made available to non-citizens, the odds of becoming a citizen go down, precisely opposite of what would be expected by the 'Welfare Reform' explanation.

Table 3 here

However, to better understand whether the changes in immigrant and welfare legislation have contributed to naturalization we need to examine the interaction between time (measured as a dichotomous variable with 1 equal to 2000-01) and the determinants of naturalization and the Safety Net Scale. Both Model 3 and Model 4 are fully interactive in that they include interaction terms between time and all variables except the block of state dummy variables. Only the significant interaction terms are shown in Table 3. First, most notable about the results is the *lack* of change in the determinants of naturalization. In the fully interactive models, the effect of immigrant welfare generosity (Safety Net Scale) becomes insignificant (Model 4). Second, foreign-born Mexicans who are less educated continue to be significantly less likely to naturalize than those who have at least a high school education. This relationship did not weaken in the post-reform time period as we would expect if welfare reform were pushing the least educated into citizenship. Third, we found no evidence that foreign-born Mexicans who were the most poor increased their levels of naturalization than those who were less poor and less in need of public assistance. This runs counter to the idea that some immigrants, especially immigrants that would be more likely to need welfare, are naturalizing in order to obtain public benefits.

The results indicate that the only determinants of naturalization to change after Welfare Reform include self-employment and marital status. Those who were self-employed were slightly less likely to become citizens after reform than before, and those who had a non-citizen spouse were more likely to become a citizen after reform. To more easily interpret these results, we estimated a reduced-form model (not shown) in which we included all main effects, state fixed effects, and only the significant interaction terms for self-employment and marital status. We converted the coefficients to predicted probabilities to better interpret the interactions. Among those with a noncitizen spouse the probability of becoming a citizen increased by well over 300 percent (from 2.7 % to 12.6%) from the pre-reform to post-reform time period. The dramatic increase in the effect of having a non-citizen spouse lends strong support to the idea that immigration and welfare policy such as PWRORA and IIRIRA have contributed to the increase in Mexican naturalization by limiting legal resident's access to unrestricted sponsorship of immediate relatives.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we show that the changes in welfare access for noncitizens due to restrictions put in place by PWRORA have not resulted in dramatic shifts in the types of immigrants becoming citizens nor in the majority of determinants associated with becoming a citizen. However, some support was shown for the idea that immigrants are obtaining citizenship in response to policies that restrict the ability to sponsor their relatives for legal migration to the U.S. We demonstrate this by examining changes in social and economic determinants of naturalization that occurred for the Mexican

foreign-born population from 1994-95 to 2000-01 with cross sectional CPS data. This suggests that a more cautious interpretation about the relationship between the increase in naturalizations and welfare reform is called for, particularly when regarding Mexican immigrants.

The research presented in this paper represents a response to prior work on the effects of welfare reform on immigrants and the link between recent surges in naturalization and immigrant restrictions of welfare benefits, but does not resolve the question completely. To do this, repeated measures of citizenship and welfare receipt would need to be analyzed to clearly understand whether the relationship is causal. Nevertheless, the results of this analysis do strongly refute the notion that immigrants who are in the most need of welfare—the poorest and least educated—are becoming citizens faster than before Welfare Reform. This research has shown that for the most part, the factors which determine whether or not a Mexican immigrant becomes a citizen have not changed throughout the 1990s, even in the face of such anti-immigrant legislation as PWRORA.

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TABLE 1

Weighted Means for Mexican Immigrants, 1994/95 and 2000/01

	1994-95	2000-01
	Mean	Mean
Naturalized Mexican Immigrants	0.15	0.25
Immigrant Welfare Access		
High welfare access	0.63	0.58
Moderately high access	0.05	0.06
Moderately low access	0.09	0.14
Low welfare access	0.23	0.22
Entry Cohort		
Pre 1965	0.12	0.07
1965-1974	0.19	0.13
1975-1981	0.29	0.19
1982-1987	0.25	0.17
1988+	0.15	0.44
Educational Attainment		
Less than 8 years	0.63	0.55
9 and 11 years	0.14	0.15
High School Graduate	0.24	0.29
Child in HH	0.72	0.71
Immigrant Child in HH	0.21	0.21
Male	0.54	0.51
Female	0.46	0.49
Marital Status		
Native Spouse	0.16	0.14
Naturalized Spouse	0.07	0.16
Non-Citizen Spouse	0.46	0.41
Previously Married	0.16	0.16
Never Married	0.14	0.12
Employed	0.57	0.61
Home owner	0.47	0.48
Self-employed	0.05	0.04
Income to Poverty Ratio		
Below 100% Poverty	0.31	0.23
100 - 124% Poverty	0.12	0.11
125 - 149% Poverty	0.10	0.10
150%+ Poverty	0.47	0.57
Age Category		
18-29	0.13	0.09
30-44	0.48	0.48
45-64	0.28	0.32
65+	0.11	0.11
N	*2558*	*3246*

TABLE 2

Percent Naturalized Mexican Foreign-born,
1994/95 and 2000/01

			Change
	1994/95	2000/01	94/95-00/01
All Mexican Foreign Born	15.1	24.8	9.7
Immigrant Welfare Access			
High welfare access	12.4	25.0	12.6
Moderately high access	15.4	19.4	4.0
Moderately low access	21.4	25.4	4.0
Low welfare access	20.0	25.4	5.5
Entry Cohort			
Pre 1965	44.0	67.7	23.7
1965-1974	16.4	44.0	27.5
1975-1981	14.7	30.7	16.0
1982-1987	7.4	24.7	17.3
1988+	5.1	9.6	4.5
Educational Attainment			
High School Graduate	20.7	29.4	8.7
9 and 11 years	13.3	21.4	8.1
Less than 8 years	13.4	23.3	10.0
Any Child in HH	10.9	19.6	8.7
Immigrant Child in HH	4.9	8.4	3.5
Male	14.8	24.2	9.3
Female	15.4	25.4	10.0
Native Spouse	21.9	29.2	7.3
Naturalized Spouse	53.8	56.3	2.5
Non-Citizen Spouse	4.5	12.2	7.7
Previously Married	22.5	33.3	10.9
Never Married	14.1	9.8	-4.3
Employed	14.7	23.1	8.4
Self Employed	30.9	29.5	-1.4
Home owner	21.3	34.6	13.3
Income to Poverty Ratio			
Below 100% Poverty	9.6	16.7	7.0
100 - 124% Poverty	12.9	21.5	8.5
125 - 149% Poverty	17.4	19.7	2.2
150%+ Poverty	18.8	29.6	10.7
Age			
18-29	3.3	5.3	2.0
30-44	12.6	17.5	4.9
45-64	17.1	29.4	12.2
65+	33.7	56.7	22.9

Source: 1994, 1995, 2000, and 2001 March Current Population Surveys

(N)	2,558	3,246	

TABLE 3

Odds Ratios on the Relationship Between Selected Variables and Mexican Naturalization (with and without State Fixed Effects).

	Additive Models				Interaction Models			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Parameter Estimate		Parameter Estimate		Parameter Estimate		Parameter Estimate	
Intercept	0.1310	*	0.0661	*	0.1738	*	0.0822	*
Time 1=2000-1, 0=1994-5	2.4174	*	2.6845	*	1.2086		1.4983	
Safety Net Scale (high =1 low =4)	0.9471		0.8726	#	0.9472		0.8833	
Entry 65-74	0.4590	*	0.4579	*	0.3728	*	0.3867	*
Entry 75-81	0.3108	*	0.3089	*	0.2713	*	0.2705	*
Entry 82-87	0.2428	*	0.2377	*	0.1831	*	0.1773	*
Entry 88+	0.1077	*	0.1025	*	0.1477	*	0.1604	*
Probability of N400 Completion	8.1052	*	27.2349	#	8.9022	*	29.4325	#
Poverty Below low-income level	0.8129		0.8159		0.8084		0.7860	
Poverty 100 - 124 percent	0.8993		0.8890		0.9845		0.9453	
Poverty 125 - 149 percent	1.0028		0.9796		1.1547		1.1071	
Eighth Grade or less	0.5269	*	0.5301	*	0.5357	*	0.5557	*
Ninth to 11 grade	0.6634	*	0.6603	*	0.6977		0.7299	
Male	0.9903		0.9966		1.1035		1.1300	
Anychild in HH	0.7731	*	0.7903	#	0.7616		0.8002	
NonCitizen Child in HH	0.5700	*	0.5621	*	0.6532		0.6637	
Ages 30 -44	1.6873	*	1.7709	*	1.9265	#	2.2327	*
Ages 45-63	1.3698		1.4613		1.5095		1.7695	
Ages 65 and up	2.2993	*	2.4111	*	2.1544	#	2.5028	#
Homeowner	1.3663	*	1.3540	*	1.2528		1.2397	
Employed	1.2709	#	1.2511	#	1.3412		1.2839	
SelfEmployed	1.3192		1.3336		2.2345	*	2.2892	*
Self Employed*Time					0.3836	*	0.3771	*
Married w/Native Spouse	1.9257	*	1.8612	*	1.4245		1.3019	
Married w/Native Spouse*Time					1.6433		1.8161	
Married w/Naturalized Spouse	5.9787	*	6.0376	*	5.3656	*	5.0455	*
Married w/Naturalized Spouse*Time					1.2949		1.4635	
Married w/ Noncitizen Spouse	0.7418	#	0.7469		0.3153	*	0.3044	*
Married w/ Noncitizen Spouse*Time					3.9005	*	4.1879	*
Previously Married	1.9313	*	1.9564	*	1.3960		1.3110	
Previously Married*Time					1.7222	#	1.9591	#
State Fixed Effects	no		yes		no		yes	
-2 Log L	4493		4398		4444		4349	
df	25		70		47		92	

Model is fully interactive with only significant interaction terms shown.

significance at the .05 level

* significance at .01 level